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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kristina Quintana appealed in two separate cases in which the district court had 
imposed sentences based on the same presentence information. Primarily, she argues 
that the district court in case number 39156 did not actually consider the mental health 
evaluations performed on her, but instead, disregarded the diagnoses provided in the 
evaluations, made its own determination as to Ms. Quintana's mental health status, and 
in so doing, failed to meet its statutory obligation from I.C. § 19-2523. Additionally, she 
contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny her motion to augment the 
appellate record with the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) prepared 
for her co-defendant, Shauntel King, which the district court expressly considered in 
case number 39156, it denied her state and federal constitutional rights to due process 
and equal protection. 1 
The State's defense of the district court's actions regarding Ms. Quintana's 
mental illnesses is based on the theory that, by rejecting those evaluations and 
substituting its own determination of Ms. Quintana's mental state for that of trained 
professionals, the district court fulfilled its statutory obligation to "consider" her mental 
illnesses. However, that position would make I.C. § 19-2522, which requires the 
appointment of a trained medical professional to perform the evaluation, superfluous. 
And, in regard to the constitutional violations, the State argues that an outline of part of 
1 Ms. Quintana also made arguments regarding the abuses of discretion regarding her 
sentences and Rule 35 motions, to which the State did not provide remarkable 
responses. As such, Ms. Quintana simply refers the Court to her Appellant's Brief on 
those issues, as indicated infra. 
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the co-defendant's PSI, reproduced in Ms. Quintana's PSI, was sufficient, rather than 
providing the whole document, as required by precedent. Neither of these responses 
reflects the state of the law, and as such, this Court should remedy those errors. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Quintana's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. The same citations used in the 
Appellant's Brief are used in this Reply Brief. (See App. Br., p.2, n.2; p.3, n.3.) 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it 
imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed, upon 
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to burglary and grand theft by 
possession of stolen property. 
2. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it 
denied Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 motion in light of the new evidence she 
presented. 
3. Whether the district court in case number 39049 abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, upon 
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to grand theft. 
4. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Quintana due process and equal 
protection when it denied her Motion to Augment with Ms. King's PSI in light of 
the district court's express consideration of that information. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed 
An Aggregate Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Eight Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana 
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Burglary And Grand Theft By Possession Of 
Stolen Property 
A. Introduction 
There is a significant distinction between simply talking about the results of a 
mental health evaluation and actually giving careful consideration to those results. As 
Ms. Quintana's mental condition was going to be a significant issue at sentencing, the 
district court was required to consider the results of the mental health evaluation that 
was performed on Ms. Quintana. It did not do so. Rather, the district court merely 
mentioned them as it dismissed them, and then the district court substituted its own 
determination in their place. As the Legislature made clear in I.C. §§ 19-2522 and 
19-2523, it is not the place of the district court to reevaluate the defendant; that is the 
reason why the statutes require the district court to appoint a trained professional to 
perform the evaluation and to consider the evidence presented in the evaluations of that 
trained professional. 
Nevertheless, the State contends that the fact that the district court talked about 
those results should be sufficient to fulfill the district court's statutory obligation. That 
interpretation of the statute is erroneous and would make I.C. § 19-2522 superfluous. 
As such, that interpretation should be rejected, along with the district court's improper 
and insufficient discussion of the results of the mental health evaluations in this case. 
That failure to properly consider the results of the mental health evaluation should, by 
4 
itself, be reason enough to vacate the imposed sentence and remand this case for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
B. The District Court In Case Number 39156 Did Not Sufficiently Consider 
Ms. Quintana's Diagnosed Mental Health Issues 
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the district court to consider the defendant's 
mental illness as a sentencing factor where that condition is likely going to be a 
significant factor at sentencing. 2 Holfon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). The 
statute's use of the mandatory language "shall" means that the district court is without 
authority to disregard that factor or the evidence thereof. See id.; Twin Falls 
County v. Idaho Gom'n on Redistricting, 152 Idaho 346, 350-51 (2012) (holding that, 
where a statute uses the mandatory language "must" or "shall," the actor is obligated to 
follow the terms of that statute). The State contends that the district court fulfilled this 
obligation. (Resp. Br., p.14.) It did not. While the district court did talk about the 
evaluations, it did not "consider" them in the manner required by statute: 
(1) Evidence of mental condition shall be received, if offered, at the time of 
sentencing of any person convicted of a crime. In determining the 
sentence to be imposed in addition to other criteria provided by law, if the 
defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the court shall consider 
such factors as: 
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; 
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional 
impairment; 
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; 
2 The record indicates that this was likely going to be a significant factor at sentencing. 
(See, e.g., R., p.89 (Ms. Qunitana's answer on the plea advisory form indicating that 
she suffers from two diagnosed mental health disorders for which she takes prescription 
medications).) 
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(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required; 
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the 
public, if at large, or the absence of such risk; 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
at the time of the offense charged. 
(2) The court shall authorize treatment during the period of confinement or 
probation specified in the sentence if, after the sentencing hearing, it 
concludes by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(a) The defendant suffers from a severe and reliably diagnosable 
mental illness or defect resulting in the defendant's inability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law; 
(b) Without treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress 
resulting in serious mental or physical deterioration of the 
defendant; 
(c) Treatment is available for such illness or defect; 
(d) The relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment are 
such that a reasonable person would consent to treatment. (of the 
offense charged.) 
(3) In addition to the authorization of treatment, the court shall pronounce 
sentence as provided by law. 
I.e. § 19-2523. Furthermore, I.e. § 19-2522 mandates that the district court "appoint at 
least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the 
mental condition of the defendant." I.e. §19-2522(1). Presumably, the district court is 
not qualified to make these determinations, or else there would be no purpose for this 
statute. The report that trained professional files must include: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of the 
defendant; 
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(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level 
of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant's 
mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create 
for the public if at large. 
I.C. § 19-2522(2). These statutes reveal that the district court does not have the 
authority or discretion to re-diagnose or to dismiss the diagnosis of the trained 
professional who performed the evaluation. See I.C. §§ 19-2522, 19-2523. It is 
restricted to considering only the degree to which the defendant is mentally ill 
(I.C. § 19-2523(1 )(a)), a determination which must be made by the appointed evaluator 
(I.C. §19-2522(2)(c)). Furthermore, the evidence which must be submitted and which 
must be given consideration includes the risk of nontreatment. I.C. §19-2522(e)-(f); 
I.C. § 19-2523(1), (2)(b)-(d). 
Nevertheless, the district court in case number 39156 expressly dismissed and 
disregarded the findings of the appointed evaluator. First, it criticized the way in which 
the appointed evaluator performed the evaluation: "I'd just note that most of the 
assessments that she -- that we had here, they don't really do the in-depth testing that 
you would when you have a full psychological evaluation." (39156 Tr., p.38, L.22 - p.39, 
L.2.) However, as long as the evaluator's report contains the information required by 
I.C. § 19-2522(2), it is a sufficient evaluation upon which the district court is required to 
rely. I.C. §19-2523(1) ("Evidence of mental condition shall be received, if offered ... "). 
The district court also disparaged the evaluator's diagnosis: "I would say half the 
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population at this point is bi-polar, so .... " (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls.2-4.) There was no 
evidence presented that showed bipolar disorder is not a significant mental illness 
(which it is, regardless of how many people suffer from it).3 (See generally 39156 R.) 
Therefore, the district court's finding in that regard is not supported by any evidence 
(much less substantial or competent evidence) in the record, and it is clearly erroneous 
and should be set aside. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,659 (2007). 
Furthermore, the district court's analysis fails to fulfill the statutory obligation 
to consider the evidence of the degree of impact Ms. Quintana's condition has on 
her. I.C. § 19-2522(2)(c). To that end, the district court is obligated under Idaho's 
individualized sentencing structure to consider "the character and needs of the 
individual [defendant] and the requirements of the community" in regard to that 
particular defendant. See, e.g., State v. Seifart, 100 Idaho 321, 324 (1979). Comparing 
the defendant's character to other offenders or potential offenders is not part of that 
sentencing scheme. See, e.g., State v. Cambron, 118 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Yet, the district court did exactly that, comparing Ms. Quintana's character and condition 
to others and so failed to meet its statutory obligation to consider Ms. Quintana's 
character by engaging in comparative considerations when imposing her sentence. 
The district court also tried to justify its decision to disregard the evaluation's 
findings by stating (again, without support in the record) that "the prison will do 
3 Bipolar disorder type I is the more severe variety of bipolar disorder, in which mood 
swings between mania and depression constitute drastic variations from normal 
behavior. National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
"Bipolar Disorder," pp.4-5 (2008), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolar-
disorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf. These episodes are more drastic and longer in 
duration than those experienced in patients with bipolar disorder type II. Id. They 
may also lead to the need for immediate hospitalization. Id. 
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additional testing. The prison never even reviews any of the mental health records that 
are provided in the presentence report." (39156 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-19.) Whether or not 
the prison considers those evaluations does not impact the district court's obligations. It 
still must consider the results from those evaluations and how they impact the 
sentencing decision, particularly as to the risks of nontreatment. I.C. § 19-2523(1)-(2). 
By disregarding the evaluation, the district court could not have considered the risks of 
treatment and nontreatment, as required by statute, since it was unwilling to consider 
the need for treatment at all. In fact, the cases on appeal demonstrate exactly what a 
proper and an improper consideration of these factors looks like. (See App. Br., p.15 
(comparing the district court's "consideration' of those factors, based on exactly the 
same reports and evaluations, in case number 39049 with the improper consideration 
(i.e., discussion and rejection) of that evidence in case number 39156).) 
Additionally, if these comments by the district court are sufficient to fulfill its 
statutory obligation to "consider" those evaluations, then I.C. § 19-2522 is deprived of 
meaning. In this case, the district court made its own, independent determination of 
whether Ms. Quintana was suffering from a mental illness: "[t]his is not a mental health 
issue. This is someone trying to avoid consequences. . . . you don't tell [the 
psychological evaluators] the full extent of your criminal activity prior to this. And so as 
a result, they -- they decide that what this was instead was bipolar disorder." (Tr., p.45, 
L.22 - p.46, L.14.) As such, if the district court is allowed to disregard the diagnosis of 
the psychological evaluator, there is no reason for the psychological evaluator to be 
appointed. Therefore, accepting the State's defense of the district court's actions in this 
case would make I.C. §19-2522 superfluous, a result which is not permitted under Idaho 
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law. See, e.g., Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 897 (2011) 
(quoting In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 131, 136 (1936): "'effect must be given to 
all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant'''). 
The district court in case number 39156 clearly failed to meet its statutory 
obligation to consider the evidence offered in regard to Ms. Quintana's mental illness. It 
did not actually consider the results of the evaluations submitted pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2522, as it was required to do by I.C. § 19-2523. Instead, it dismissed those results and 
substituted its own determination of whether Ms. Quintana was suffering from a mental 
condition. Therefore, the district court in case number 39156 failed to fulfill its statutory 
obligation, and thus, the resulting excessive sentence should be vacated and this case 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing.4 
II. 
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Denied 
Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 Motion In Light Of The New Evidence She Presented 
The State's response in regard to this argument is not remarkable, and as such, 
no further reply is necessary in regard to this issue. Accordingly, Ms. Qunitana simply 
refers the Court back to pages 21-23 of her Appellant's Brief. 
4 The State's response in regard to the district court's failure to sufficiently consider 
other mitigating factors besides Ms. Quintana's mental illness is not remarkable, and as 
such, no further reply is necessary in that regard. Accordingly, Ms. Quintana simply 
refers the Court back to pages 16-21 of her Appellant's Brief. 
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III. 
The District Court In Case Number 39049 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A 
Unified Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana 
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft 
The State's response in regard to this argument is not remarkable, and as such, 
no further reply is necessary in regard to this issue. Accordingly, Ms. Qunitana simply 
refers the Court back to page 24 of her Appellant's Brief. 
IV. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Quintana Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment With Ms. King's PSI In Light Of The District 
Court's Express Consideration Of That PSI 
A. Introduction 
The State makes two responses in regard to the Idaho Supreme Court's violation 
of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it 
denied her motion to augment with Ms. King's PSI, even though it was considered by 
the district court in aggravation (i.e., the district court considered Ms. King to be an 
additional victim of Ms. Quintana's actions instead of a co-defendant or even the driving 
force behind their actions). First, it argues that relief would not be available if the 
case is assigned to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals could simply 
recognize the violation without overturning the Supreme Court's decision and grant 
Ms. Quintana relief because her rights were violated. Otherwise, the Supreme Court 
could retain this case and rectify its error. Further, the fact that Ms. King's PSI was 
considered by the district court and used as aggravation demonstrates the prejudice 
caused by withholding it on appeal. 
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Second, the State contends that, an outline of one part of Ms. King's PSI was 
reproduced in Ms. Quintana's PSI rectified any harm done. However, the quoted 
language is not a reproduction of Ms. King's PSI, but rather, as Ms. Qunitana's PSI 
states, an outline summary of the relationship between Ms. King and Ms. Quintana. 
Second, even if a portion of that document were a complete excerpt of Ms. King's PSI, 
the district court stated that it considered the entire document, not just an excerpt. 
Therefore, the excerpt would not rectify the violatoin because Ms. Quintana would still 
be deprived of information the district court considered in aggravation, as there is no 
indication that was the only portion of Ms. King's PSI considered by the district court in 
that regard. 
As such, Ms. Quintana's rights were violated, there is no remedy, whole or 
partial, in the record, and either appellate court is capable of providing a remedy for 
those violations. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court Deprived Ms. Quintana Of Her Constitutional Rights 
To Due Process And Equal ProtectionS 
The State does not contend that the deprivation of evidence considered by the 
district court in aggravation would not constitute a violation of Ms. Quintana's 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. (See generally Resp. 
Br., pp.18-24.) Rather, it only contends that she failed to show that the district court 
S Ms. Quintana also argued that the decision to not augment the record on appeal with 
Ms. King's PSI could deprive her of her constitutional right to effective assistance of 
appellate counsel. As the State did not provide any argument in response to that claim, 
no reply is necessary and Ms. Quintana simply refers this Court to pages 27-28 of her 
Appellant's Brief. 
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relied on the absent information and that the absent information was not sufficiently 
reproduced in Ms. Quintana's PSI.6 (See Resp. Br., pp.18-24.) 
As to the State's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny 
Ms. Quintana's request for access to Ms. King's PSI did not deprive Ms. Qunitana of a 
sufficient record (see Resp. Br., p.20-22) is disingenuous and explicitly disproved by the 
record. The record is very clear that the district court relied on Ms. King's PSI: 
"[HJaving read Miss King's presentence report and seeing the interaction, I consider 
Miss King a victim of Miss Quintana." (39156 Tr., pAD, LS.6-9 (emphasis added).) The 
district court expressly stated that it read the entire presentence report prepared in 
Ms. King's case, and it clearly indicated that it was using the information learned from 
6 The State also asserts that Ms. Quintana's only opportunity to ensure a complete 
record of right was during the objection to the record period established by I.A.R. 28, 
and that because Ms. Quintana did not file the I.A.R. 30 motion to augment immediately 
thereafter, the denial did not deprive her of due process. (See Resp. Br., pp.22-23.) 
This argument is flawed in multiple respects. First, I.A.R. 30 has no limitations as to 
when a motion must be filed. See generally I.A.R. 30. In fact, I.A.R. 30.1 (a) allows for 
corrections to be made to the record "[a]t any time after the filing of a transcript or 
record." I.A.R. 30.1 (a); see also I.A.R. 34(f) (allowing any party to file supplemental 
authority at any time before the decision is made). This suggests ensuring that the 
transcript, record, and decision on appeal are correct and complete is the primary goal 
of the Rules. Second, regardless of whether Ms. Quintana or any other defendant opts 
to use the process set forth in I.A.R. 28 or I.A.R. 30 to ensure a complete and correct 
appellate record, the fact that the district court considered and relied upon a document 
means that document needs to be augmented to the record; a failure to do so denies 
the defendant the constitutional protections of due process. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 
146 Idaho 822, 837-38 (2008). Because the district court explicitly considered all of 
Ms. King's PSI, that whole document needs to be included in Ms. Quintana's appellate 
record, or else she has not been provided with her constitutional due process. See id. 
Finally, the State provides no authority to support its argument that Ms. Quintana's 
rights were not violated because she opted not to use the procedures set forth in 
I.C.R. 28, and as such, should not be considered. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 
(1996). 
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that review as an aggravating factor against Ms. Quintana.7 The Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that "denial of access to the information which the district court utilizes in 
making its decision deprives the offender of meaningful notice of that which he is 
attempting to challenge and consequently, it deprives the offender of any meaningful 
opportunity to be heard." Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38. Deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard violates the state and federal constitutional due process 
protections. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 
425, 445 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998); 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 544 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Additionally, the State is obligated to provide the indigent defendant with equal 
protection by ensuring she has an appellate record "that is sufficient for adequate 
appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002). Because the document considered by the 
district court is necessary for appeal based on due process principles (see Armstrong 
and Card), the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court refused to augment the record with 
that document in this case, where Ms. Quintana is an indigent defendant, demonstrates 
a violation of her equal protection rights as well. See Strand, 137 Idaho at 462. As 
such, the decision to deny Ms. Quintana access to documents expressly considered by 
the district court clearly violated her state and federal constitutional due process and 
equal protection rights. 
7 The fact that the district court used that information in aggravation and that she has 
been denied the opportunity to review that information demonstrates the prejudice 
caused to Ms. Quintana's appeal. See, e.g., Sheel v. Rinard, 91 Idaho 736,738 (1967). 
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C. The Outline Of Ms. King's PSI Reproduced In Ms. Quintana's PSI Is Insufficient 
To Remedy The Violation Of Ms. Quintana's Constitutional Rights To Due 
Process And Equal Protection 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State quotes several paragraphs from 
Ms.Quintana's PSI, erroneously believing that those statements are sufficient to rectify 
the violation of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights. (See Resp. Br., pp.2D-22 (quoting 
39156 PSI, pp.12-13).) The quoted material is part of the section from Ms. Quintana's 
PSI where the presentence investigator summarized the romantic relationships 
Ms. Quintana has had. (39156 PSI, pp.11-13.) The information the investigator 
provided was "outlined in the Presentence Report prepared for the co-defendant, 
Shauntel King." (39156 PSI, p.12 (emphasis added).) Additionally, it is not a full 
presentation of the information considered by the district court, which was the entire PSI 
prepared for Ms. King. (39156 Tr., p.4D, Ls.6-9.) 
Ms. Quintana is entitled to access to the information considered by the district 
court, not a mere outline of part of the information considered by the district court. 
See Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38. "It would be ... a hazardous endeavor for [the 
appellate court] to rule upon an appeal without access to all relevant material used in 
the hearing below." Sheel, 91 Idaho at 738 (emphasis added). Therefore, while this 
reproduced outline might provide some indication as to some of the information the 
district court saw in Ms. King's PSI, the fact that the outline was reproduced does not 
remedy the violation of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights. See Sheel, 91 Idaho at 
738; Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38. 
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D. Either Of Idaho's Appellate Courts Are Capable Of Providing Ms. Quintana With 
A Remedy For The Violation Of Her Constitutional Rights 
Having demonstrated the violation of Ms. Quintana's constitutional rights, the 
only remaining question is as to the appropriate remedy. The State focuses on the 
ability of the Court of Appeals to remedy this situation first. (Resp. Br., pp.17 -19.) 
Of course, the Idaho Supreme Court could decide not to assign this case and rectify 
its error itself. See I.A.R. 108. However, even if the case is assigned to the Court of 
Appeals, the Court of Appeals could still afford a remedy to Ms. Quintana. 
Ms. Quintana would not be asking the Court of Appeals to overrule the decision of the 
Idaho Supreme Court made in regard to the motion to augment the record. Rather, she 
is asserting that certain, now-final, decisions made during the appellate review process 
deprived her of certain constitutional rights. (See App. Br., p.29 (focusing on the first 
alternative relief request).) 
In acknowledgment of the fact that those violations exist, Ms. Quintana would be 
requesting that the Court of Appeals grant her some form of relief. For example, in light 
of the deprivation of these rights, this Court could reverse the presumption set forth in 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999), in her case, and presume that the 
non-augmented PSI supports her claims, demonstrating that the district court, 
particularly in case number 39156, abused its discretion and imposed an excessive 
sentence. It could also determine that because of the violations, Ms. Quintana's overall 
sentence should be reduced. As such, either of Idaho's appellate courts is capable of 
providing Ms. Quintana with a remedy for the violation of her constitutional rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Quintana respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that her cases, particularly 
case number 39156, be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
Otherwise, she respectfully requests that counsel be provided with access to 
Ms. King's PSI and that counsel be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary 
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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